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Roots and Threats of Radical Extremism in Kazakhstan

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Abstract. *This article challenges the problem of radical extremism in Kazakhstan, its roots, causes, and consequences of the attempted coup d'état in 2022. Expert surveys, focus groups, in-depth interviews with the Muslim religious communities, including Salafists, outcomes of student group discussions, and personal observations allowed to identify the theoretical foundations and practical roots and consequences of radical extremism. Obtained results: a review of the external and internal causes of radical extremism; an analysis of radical extremism and the religious communities; an evaluation of the government measures. The study's finding is a formation of the interactive framework consisting of four primary I - tools: Inclusive; Involvement; Income; Ideology for the solution of the problem of radical extremism.*

Keywords: 'religious extremism', 'non-traditional Islam', 'Salafism'.

INTRODUCTION

The events of January 2022 in Kazakhstan, associated with an attempted coup d'état and an armed rebellion to undermine the state's integrity, have become a new stage in the actualization of the problem of radical extremism. The problem of religious extremism, the activation of "sleeping radical cells," the widespread involvement of young people in extremist activities were intensified and turned into a long-term challenge for Kazakhstan. The government of Kazakhstan in the conditions of political crisis has launched a large-scale political modernization and transformation of society, a package of the political, social and economic reforms aimed at eliminating the negative consequences of crisis. Political and social reforms are directed towards greater democratization, openness, elimination of corruption and inequality, building a just and inclusive society for all. In the opinion of the author, these reforms should include measures for the solution of the problem of radical extremism among youth.

The research questions of the article:

- a description of the specifics of radical extremism, "sleeping radical cells," and adherents of non-traditional movements of Islam in Kazakhstan;
- an analysis of radical extremism and the non-traditional religious communities;
- an evaluation of the government measures;
- a formulation of a methodology for studying non-traditional movements of Islam.

The theoretical work consisted in studying foreign and domestic sources and methods for investigating the causes and consequences of radical extremism and identifying population groups involved in radicalism. The empirical work was the organization and conduct of a comprehensive sociological study (focus groups and in-depth interviews) with adherents of traditional and non-traditional movements of Islam in Kazakhstan. Based on the results of this work, the author developed recommendations based on a generalization of the literature review, an analysis of the religious situation in Kazakhstan, the results of a sociological study, and expert discussion aimed at helping to solve the problem of radical extremism.

A review of international and domestic theoretical sources and practical experience of working with adherents of non-traditional movements of Islam, in particular, young people, showed that:

- this topic is relatively new for Kazakhstani science, which is manifested in the lack of research and analysis on this issue;
- adherents of non-traditional movements of Islam and radical extremism are different groups, which requires a differentiated approach for each specific subgroup;

it is necessary to work with adherents of non-traditional Islamic movements, especially young people, since their socialization is difficult, which in the future may threaten stability in society.

The following results of a sociological study of the current religious situation have been obtained: compilation of a "social portrait" of adherents of non-traditional Islamic movements; identification of groups of this category of citizens; formulation of the recommendations for work with adherents of non-traditional Islamic movements in Kazakhstan. The study's finding is a formation of the interactive framework consisting of four primary I - tools: Inclusive; Involvement; Income; Ideology for the governance of radical extremism.

METHODS AND METHODOLOGY

The work of state authorities to counter religious extremism, including a package of political, social, economic, and ideological measures, needs serious scientific and methodological support, methodology for studying radical extremism.

As part of the study, the author conducted a sociological study to investigate the mechanisms of work with adherents of non-traditional movements of Islam, including youth. The study used two methods for collecting empirical information: a focus group (group discussion) and an in-depth interview. To study the adherents of non-traditional Islamic movements and the mechanisms of working with them in Kazakhstan, focus groups were held with this category of the population, including young people. To solve the tasks set, a research toolkit was developed. The focus group scenario and the in-depth interview questionnaire were written in two languages – Russian and Kazakh. Focus groups were organized and held in Almaty and Mecca.

The empirical stage of the study consisted of the following types of work:

1. Preparation of a manual that includes questions, topics of discussion, instructions for conducting focus groups. As part of the study, a manual for the moderator was prepared, which reflects the main tasks, recommendations for conducting focus groups, as well as a focus group scenario. The scenario is a list of topics for discussion and examples of questions on them.
2. During organizing and conducting the focus group, the age and gender factors, as well as differentiation by place of residence (urban and rural) were taken into account. In addition to conducting a focus group with the target group - adherents of non-traditional religious movements, a focus group was also organized and conducted with experts in the field of religious policy (Almaty).

The specifics of this category of the population and the places of interviews during the mass pilgrimage did not allow audio and video recording, the recordings of the conversations were transferred to paper. The prepared results of the interview served as the basis for the analytical material for this article.

3. Conducting in-depth interviews. After determining the main groups of this category of the population, work began on compiling a "social portrait" of representatives of this group. The in-depth interview method was used as a sociological method. An in-depth interview allowed to obtain detailed information about open and partially hidden levels and aspects of the perception of the problem, as well as the motives of the respondent's behavior. Ten in-depth interviews were conducted with representatives of non-traditional movements of Islam. Based on the results of in-depth interviews, "social portraits" of representatives of non-traditional movements of Islam were compiled. A social portrait is an integrated description of the main social, demographic and other personality features of the target group.

Analysis of the obtained results. Based on the results of the focus groups, an analysis was prepared, which presents the main conclusions and recommendations for working with adherents of non-traditional movements of Islam.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In international practice, there is still no harmonized definition of this phenomenon as radical religious extremism. Extremism is a term in sociology introduced by Lipset in his book "Political Man" (1960). The concept of extremism by Lipset developed jointly with Bendix, Raab (1961), combines the social base, political behavior, the state of the economy, and the religious factor. Lipset, in his turn, determined the social roots of extremism. Graaf (2020) proposed radicalism's psychological and social explanation. He denied both macro-level approaches that study structural conditions in society and micro-level approaches that focus on individual conditions. Berman (2009) outlined the political and social roots of radical religious extremism that thrives by taking advantage of the absence of the state. The extremists can develop into highly efficient terrorist organizations by providing communities with essential benefits in exchange for their loyalty and their involvement. Sotlar (2004) expressed political and ideological factors of extremism which determines the activities that are not under norms of the state. Iannaccone (2012) explained the economic factor of religious extremism as a product of market forces.

In general, radical religious extremism, based on political, social, economic, and ideological roots, expresses the adherence to extreme and radical views of the action in politics and society. Finally, in the broadest sense, the concept of radical religious extremism has been increasingly used to define the process in which all stakeholders, individuals, public groups, political parties, religious organizations at all levels - local, national, regional, and international- interact to achieve common goals.

The formation of so-called 'sleeping cells' in countries, as the central infrastructural terrorist unit outside the zones of direct hostilities, is one of the main tactics used by the radical movements. 'Sleeping cell' is regarded as a group of individuals of a radical orientation, acting as supporters of a particular terrorist organization, carrying out covert planning and preparation for committing terrorist acts (Chesnokova, 2005). They can stay in such a 'sleeping' ('frozen') state for a long time, waiting for a command or a call for action from the governing bodies. 'Sleeping cell' can vary from 2-3 to several dozen people. However, the upper limit is usually limited to 15-20 people since many participants increase the likelihood of information leakage and make it challenging to maintain conspiracy in the group. (Oleinik, 2004)

Based on the above definitions, concerning the Kazakhstani case, the most appropriate description sounds like this: a 'sleeping radical cell' - a group of people of a radical orientation, who is a supporter of a particular terrorist organization and has a secretive, conspiratorial nature of the activity. The group

intensifies its terrorist activities on command from the leaders of the parent terrorist organization. The group remains in a dormant state, for a certain period does not show its extremist views and plans for future attacks. Many such groups are a mixture of criminal gangs and religious communities. Most of them were engaged in robbery racketeering. Religious extremist ideology was often just a cover for the underlying criminal activity. (KISS, 2020). In Kazakhstan, all radical groups are divided into three types: jamaats, which include young people united on a religious basis; sabotage groups, which includes foreign and domestic militants, specially trained; gangs that represent ordinary criminal groups, which become religiously radical under the influence of a leader or other factors.

THE EXTERNAL ROOTS OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

The external dimension embraces international terrorist threats. The Iraqi and Syrian conflicts creating the Islamic State (I.S.) in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon have become an indicator of the fusion of terrorism with radical extremism. The departure of the Islamic State underground after its defeat led to the continuation of the “guerrilla” war and the emergence of numerous bases and training camps for militants in neighboring countries. There is a process of transforming the I.S. into a mobile form in the form of terrorist groups localized in the north of Afghanistan and carrying out attacks on the neighboring states of Central Asia, which threatens to provoke foreign military intervention. The withdrawal of the U.S. military contingent from Afghanistan in August 2021 led to an increase in devastation and instability in the country and its spread throughout the Central Asian region. The transformation of northern Afghanistan into a stronghold of international terrorism led by the Afghan wing of I.S. forms a springboard for implementing destructive plans in Central Asia in the spirit of the ideology of the ‘caliphate’. Fighters from the Central Asian states undergo combat training in training camps on the north-eastern border of Afghanistan. They openly proclaim their goal to overthrow the Central Asian republics' legitimate authorities to spread their influence over the entire Eurasian space. There is a risk of terrorist attacks committed by veteran fighters who have returned to their countries. As a result, Kazakhstan was attacked by radicals and jihadists who tried to undermine statehood. (UN Security Council, 2021)

The activation of veteran terrorists and the process of returning the I.S. militants from the places of armed conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan pose a danger to the region's countries. Veterans join other jihadist entities, create new organizations, continue their subversive activities after returning home. In this regard, the threat of their committing terrorist acts in the region's countries is relatively high. The infiltration of militants under the guise of peaceful refugees during the mass exodus of ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and representatives of other ethnic groups from Afghanistan to the countries of the region in the fall of 2021 contributed to a broader penetration of extremist and terrorist groups from abroad into the territory of Central Asian countries. (Cabar.Asia, 2021)

According to Kazakbaev, ‘sleeping cells’ in the states of Central Asia can receive support from Al-Qaeda, the I.S., the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan (ETIM), Jamaat Ansarullah, and other international terrorist groups who are interested in promoting their ideology. ‘Sleeping cells’ may be activated due to the situation in Afghanistan. (Kazakbayev, 2021) Azizi noted specific ‘sleeping cells’ in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan that maintain contact with Afghanistan. If they were activated, the Central Asian security services will face a severe problem. (Azizi, 2021) It is critically important to understand “why the state ‘overslept’ the underground preparation of terrorist attacks by militant ‘sleeping cells’”. (Tokayev, 2022) Due to Yertysbaev, “the national betrayal and conspiracy lie because training camps have been operating in Kazakhstan for several years. The National Security Committee, which periodically neutralized this group, was silent about the numerous training camps established in the mountains near Almaty.” (Yertysbaev, 2022)

THE INTERNAL ROOTS OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

The internal roots of a hybrid terrorist attack with the ultimate goal of destabilization and a coup d'état in Kazakhstan lie in the poor social-economic conditions. Kazantsev noted the tragic events were caused mainly by severe socio-economic problems. (Kazantsev, 2017) Indeed, the gap between rich and poor, inequality in living conditions, corruption played the role of a trigger, which was used by militants, terrorists, and conspirators. (Tokayev, 2022)

Umarov, Gabuev emphasized the essential socio-economic prerequisites for the powerful protests that swept Kazakhstan in January 2022. There is the deepening gap between the relative economic success and the low standard of living of the vast majority of the country's population; overconcentration of national wealth in the hands of the elite; the raw material nature of the country's economy, its dependence on large international companies and the situation on the world market. (Umarov&Gabuev, 2022) Polyakov pointed out that poverty jointly with the poor religious education of the population may have detrimental consequences in the future. Polyakov (2014). These factors provoke some Muslims to accept the ideas of radical Islam and the transition of some citizens to positions of religiously motivated opposition to the existing constitutional order.

According to the domestic and foreign experts, the political trigger of the protests was the protracted transit of power. Dubnov noted that the real reason for the unrest is the dissatisfaction of the population with the 'old' political elites, which has reached the maximum level, and the socio-economic pressure that has increased against the backdrop of the pandemic. (Dubnov, 2022) According to Meister, the political crisis is due to people's fatigue from an oligarchic rule, the absence of political institutions, a real parliament, honest elections, an actual free press, and the fundamental activity of political parties. (Meister, 2022) Dubnov and Meister note that the increase in gas prices in Kazakhstan was only a formal reason for the start of mass protests. They draw attention to the socio-economic background of the protest. Socio-economic pressure on the country's population increases; loss of income and lack of prospects for change was the last straw. (RBK, 2022)

RADICAL EXTREMISM

The study aims to analyze the Salafists' participation in the protests. In 2016-2021, in Kazakhstan, according to the Committee for Religious Affairs (CRA RK), there were over 20 thousand adherents of Salafism. As part of the state de-radicalization policy, over 300 followers of non-traditional religious movements returned to the traditional faith. At the same time, there is no guarantee that they will not return to their former beliefs. (CRA RK, 2020)

Our study discusses vital problems and components concerning radical extremism. Trends in the development of the situation in religious extremism over 30 years of independent development have identified the main problems that are sources of conflicts and instability in the country. Our approach is based on the fact that radicalism in Kazakhstan has two dimensions: external and internal, and four levels of roots and factors: political, social, economic, and ideological (religious). Accordingly, the resolution of the crisis requires adopting decisions and measures at the domestic and international levels along political, social, economic, and religious tracks.

POLITICAL FACTORS OF RADICALIZATION

There are political factors such as:

- aggravation of public demand for social justice;
- increased public distrust in the institutions of power;
- total corruption and unfair distribution of benefits in society;

- lack of effective mechanisms for political participation of the population and limited access of citizens to political decision-making.
- protracted transit of political power, change of political leadership did not bring any significant changes in political practice;
- the existing de facto system of dual power has already complicated the decision-making process and hindered the progress of social development.

The worst scenario for developing the situation in the region could be the formation of 'failed state' that does not control its territory.

ECONOMIC FACTORS OF RADICALIZATION

In the conditions of political problems, the economic factors of radicalization are actualized due to:

- aggravation of the economic situation, a slowdown in economic development;
- inefficient system of national wealth distribution;
- deterioration of the economic situation and a sharp drop in real incomes of the population;
- the problem of unemployment;
- the growing inequality;
- limited economic opportunities for the younger generation;
- blocking social elevators;
- increasing debt load of the population;
- the deepening gap between relative economic success and the low standard of living of the vast majority of the country's population.

SOCIAL FACTORS OF RADICALIZATION

Acute social problems are critical factors in the radicalization of the population and the strengthening of protest moods. The economic crisis associated with COVID-19 led to the massive closure of small and medium-sized businesses, unemployment, increased social tension, and the population's protest potential as a whole. The process of marginalization, due to unfavorable socio-economic conditions, has acquired the most complex form in rural areas. The rural population has been particularly affected by a sharp decline in living standards, rising unemployment, and underdeveloped social infrastructure. In recent years, the outflow of the young population from villages to cities has significantly increased, which, along with difficulties associated with employment, low competitiveness in the labor market, and lack of housing conditions, in many cases led to an aggravation of the problem of social adaptation of young people to the conditions of urban life. The feeling of social injustice that arises due to social stratification and high differentiation in the standard of living of the population, people's disappointment about finding a job, further career growth. The increase in prices for liquefied gas, land reform, and other unpopular decisions triggered the expression of social discontent and protests. At the same time, the forms of protests can vary from participation in peaceful rallies to armed demonstrations.

IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS OF RADICALIZATION

Salafist recruiters use such factors as aggravation of socio-economic problems, shortcomings in public administration, ideology, lack of influence and authority of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan (SAMK), poor religious literacy of the population. The ideas of building a 'just state', an

Islamic caliphate based on the principles of social inclusiveness, adequate distribution of social wealth, getting rid of corruption, overcoming inequality, are popular among the population, especially youth. Muslim identity is formed in mosques, contributing to Muslims' inclusion in local jamaats, including Salafist ones. As a rule, young people do not have sufficient religious knowledge, do not understand Islamic dogma's intricacies, and do not distinguish between traditional and non-traditional Islam. The distribution of propaganda videos on social networks, psychologically constructed and well-edited, contributes to turning young people's religion towards radicalism, aggression, and extremist actions.

RELIGIOUS FACTORS OF RADICALIZATION

Religious factors of radicalization are associated with the intensification of disengagement among Muslims. The Muslims of Kazakhstan are split into various ideological currents: adherents of Sufism, Salafis, and supporters of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Kazakhstan (SAMK). The SAMK is also influenced by various currents and groupings, divided into various grounds: graduates of various religious, educational institutions, supporters of various schools. The critical challenge is the further expansion of supporters of the Salafist ideology.

Kazakh Salafists are also heterogeneous and consist of Takfirits, Madkhalits, and others. Salafists do not recognize the SAMK, although not all groups call for jihad or open defiance of the authorities.

The strengthening of the positions of non-traditional and extremist religious movements takes place in the conditions of the low authority and influence of the SAMK in the Muslim community. The main reasons for this are as follows:

- the imams of the SAMK, who are formally spiritual mentors of the communities of believers, are not real leaders due to the insufficient level of their education and competence in theological and secular matters.
- Imams are not ready or do not have the opportunity to discuss socio-political issues with believers. The main range of issues discussed by the imams concerns the domestic sphere, primarily rituals. In turn, the Salafists are most active in matters of socio-political issues, manifestations of social injustice, as well as the norms of behavior of Muslims, recommended by 'pure' Islam;
- the SAMK lacks mechanisms for social assistance to needy Muslims. The financial resources of mosques are small and are spent on maintaining the mosque itself.

FINDING

The article's finding is the study of the phenomenon of the youth, who actively participated in the protests, based on the sociological survey. The uniqueness of this investigation lies in the fact that for the first time in Kazakhstan a comprehensive work was carried out to study the youth, who are followers of the Salafist radical ideology. This circumstance made it possible to draw up a 'social portrait' of representatives of this category of youth, to reveal the causes and consequences of this phenomenon. Moreover, the increase of radical youth, jointly with religious illiteracy and poverty contribute to the growing popularity of radical ideology in assessments and approaches to social reality. Unemployed youth, especially in rural areas, due to their age, insufficient education, and life experience, are more radical in their assessments and approaches to social reality. Thus, the bulk of the protesters in 2022 were young people. Considering that young people aged 14 to 29 make up approximately 30% of the population of Kazakhstan, these factors increase social tension and the protest potential of the country as a whole. This group of youth are quickly recruited into extremist organizations. Also, the protesters were formed from the young people who could not pay their debts on loans. According to the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the country's total number of loan defaulters was more than 1.1 million at the end of 2021. Most young people fall into

the category of 'functional poverty', when a person lives 'paycheck to paycheck' or is in debt at the expense of loans. (NB RK, 2021)

The reliability of the research results is ensured by an overview of modern academic domestic and foreign literature of both political and social sciences on the research topic, which made it possible to build an integrative framework that meets the standards accepted in sociology. This analysis is grounded on a content analysis of state documents, observer participation at expert meetings, and application of principles of religious theory, enabled by relevant training.

The study synthesizes outcomes and develops an integrative framework for the governance of radical extremism. This framework will be uniquely based on a sociological survey of the members and leaders of the Salafist groups, in particular, young people, a comprehensive integration of religious approaches to the governance of extremism, an understanding of intricacies of state measures and an analysis of actors' perspectives.

The author of the article conducted a sociological study to identify the causes, factors, and consequences of radical extremism, the mechanisms of recruitment into non-traditional religious movements (NRT). The study, conducted between 2011 and 2022, includes observation, sociological surveys, 25 in-depth interviews with members and leaders of Salafist groups from two major cities and three regions of Kazakhstan. The analysis is also based on consideration of various points of view: the views of officials and opposition forces, politicians, diplomats, representatives of law enforcement agencies, experts, leaders of civil society, religious organizations, and the private sector.

The study's novelty lies in the fact that it was conducted in traditional Muslim communities at the official mosques of Almaty and Astana and during mass pilgrimages (Hajj to Mecca, Medina). The article describes that Salafists' adherents intensify their propaganda and recruiting activities during the Hajj. Pilgrimage to holy places usually gathers many people from Kazakhstan, about 300 people, representing all regions of the country, various social groups, people of different professions and employment, all age groups, except for children.

Our study also determined the recruitment mechanism of young people into radical 'sleeping sells'. The recruitment of Muslims occurs during visits to mosques, 'halal' cafes, markets, and bazaars, where there is a large concentration of visitors and the unemployed. Recruiters start a conversation with visitors offer help. Having established contact, they gradually begin to promote 'pure Islam', give 'real' books to read, offer not to go to the mosque, attend meetings of 'true believers' in the apartment, in 'unofficial' mosques and prayer rooms. Recruitment is also actively carried out through the Internet and social networks.

The sociological survey allowed to define the factors of the attractiveness of radical ideology for youth. In social development in Kazakhstan, Salafism is becoming more and more attractive, especially for young people. Salafist communities, possessing significant financial resources, unofficially assist young people in finding employment, issuing microcredits, creating their own business and finding housing. They practice an individual approach to their members and offer a more effective mechanism for adapting young people moving from villages to city, who experiencing financial difficulties. Such communities create fraternal, equal, trusting relations; there is genuine mutual assistance in providing spiritual and material support to the poor members. This interaction model replaces the secular mechanisms of socialization and adaptation to society for young people. An atmosphere of brotherhood and mutual assistance, formed among members of the Salafi communities, is the primary motive for joint actions or actions, including those of a protest, extremist nature. The activation of propaganda and recruitment occurs due to the presence of such factors as the following:

1. comprehensive representation of all segments of the population;

2. a unique trusting, fraternal atmosphere; believers, being in holy places, become the most sincere, open, treat other pilgrims as brothers in faith, willingly make contact, enter into conversations;
3. association based on a collective fivefold prayer, meetings, sermons, conversations, joint meals, group visits to holy places, solemn religious rites;
4. maintenance of the degree of tolerance for expressing different views and beliefs.

From the other hand, traditional mosques controlled by the SAMK, unlike the Salafi communities, do not provide the full range of material, financial and spiritual assistance to believers. They tend to form vertical rather than horizontal links. Imams do not know their parishioners personally and focus mainly on conducting Islamic everyday rituals and not on the practices of adaptation and socialization of young people, providing targeted assistance to the community members.

SOCIAL PORTRAIT OF PEOPLE SUBJECT TO RECRUITMENT IN KAZAKHSTAN

- Young people of age between 20 and 30, most of them from the countryside, have secondary education, do not have a stable job and permanent source of income, with low material wealth, debt load, distorted legal consciousness, low personal self-esteem.
- People who consider themselves Muslims do not observe all religious rites. The recruiter becomes the only 'guide' on their righteous path.
- Newcomers who have recently started to practice Islam have not had time to join any religious group, and as newly converted Muslims, they search for a spiritual mentor.
- Young unmarried girls who practice or show interest in Islam. The main motive for their recruitment is the desire of girls to start a family and have children.

According to the calculations of the ideologists of Salafism, the recruiter should become an authoritative person for them, who will instill in them the necessary ideas and views and lead them in the 'righteous way'.

PECULIARITIES OF THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS IN KAZAKHSTAN

- a detailed interpretation of the provisions of the Koran and the Sunnah, primarily relating to the canons of 'pure Islam', the conduct of 'jihad' not only as an internal spiritual work, but also as an armed struggle; references to radical Islamic theologians; use of terminology characteristic of religious extremist structures; glorification of the life of 'mujahideen' of various eras, focusing on the sacredness of war;
- the division into 'us' and 'them' on a religious basis; identification of a typical 'enemy', for example, in the person of the official government, the clergy; pressure on a heightened religious self-consciousness.
- belief in the oppression of Muslims and calls for the support of brothers in faith; criticism of the passivity of Muslims in defending their rights and values;
- manifestation of unusual increased attention to the emotional state of a person, his problems; attracting the attention of individuals who feel disadvantaged, with heightened political or patriotic convictions; readiness to assist in the absence of a request for help; the ability to exert a controlling psychological influence on the interlocutor.

STAGES OF INVOLVEMENT IN EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS

- identification of a person who is a potential target for involvement in a sect, extremist or terrorist organization;

- collection of information about the object; studying the statements of a particular person in conversations social networks in order to establish his psychological state, mood, correspondence through personal messages with the object itself;
- evaluation of the information received from the point of view of attracting a potential candidate to one or another action in one role or another;
- demonstration of dissatisfaction with the state system, specific political figures, and politics;
- identification of people by personal qualities: willingness to resist society, the state, the government; the ability to obtain helpful information for terrorist organizations.
- identification of people according to the degree of their usefulness for the organization: a person has particular skills or knowledge necessary for an extremist or terrorist organization; speaks foreign languages, has knowledge in the field of information technologies, has special professional knowledge; has contacts with representatives of state institutions, the media; has stable contacts in a specific religious group of interest to an extremist or terrorist organization; has minimal military training or combat experience.
- establishing direct contact with a potential object, conversations, suggestions to study particular literature or view unique sites; the recruiter, as a rule, adheres to a particular 'legend' and reports information about himself that the recruited person will positively perceive: he is also disappointed with the way of life, but found a way out.
- assessment of personal psychological qualities of a person and his current psychological, personal, material problems; definition: how exactly the qualities and problems of a person can be used to involve him in the activities of an extremist or terrorist organization;
- a direct offer to join the organization; participation is presented to solve problems get out of the worldly, psychological, or ideological 'dead end'.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The preparation of this study of young people who are adherents of non-traditional Islam, demanded a comprehensive work, which included a review and analysis of the external and internal causes of radical extremism, the international and national dimensions of this phenomenon, group discussions and in-depth interviews, and the organization of expert reviews, summary of conclusions and recommendations.

Thus, the analysis shows, such a social phenomenon as the Salafist youth, i.e. young people who are adherents of Salafism and do not participated in the public secular life, attracts huge interest. As the review of the situation with radical extremism demonstrates, young people are one of the socially vulnerable groups in society. The youth, who moved from the villages to the cities, are in a the most difficult situation. The consideration of domestic experience has shown, difficulties of their adaptation to urban conditions is common to all regions, thus fueling discontent in society. In this regard, the relevance of the youth marginalization and employment has sharpened. The economic crisis and instability have a negative impact on the youth's social well-being, their competitiveness, and their ability to integrate into the society and influence the development and future of their country.

The article's finding is the study of the phenomenon of the youth, who actively participated in the protests, based on the sociological survey. The specificity of this investigation lies in the fact that for the first time in Kazakhstan a comprehensive work was carried out to study the youth, who are followers of the Salafist radical ideology. This circumstance made it possible to draw up a 'social portrait' of representatives of this category of youth, to reveal the causes and consequences of this phenomenon, peculiarities of the recruitment process in Kazakhstan, stages of involvement in extremist organizations.

The review of external and domestic roots, international and national dimensions of radical extremism, experience in contacting with the youth, involved into non-traditional movements of Islam, allowed to make the following conclusions.

The concept of youth, adherents of Salafism is a new phenomenon and little studied. The problem of studying young people of this category began to be developed relatively recently. No data is available on the percentage of youth in Salafist communities. Experts note that despite the increased interest on the part of state bodies and officials to this category of youth, the issue demands deeper studies.

The political crisis associated with the problem of radical extremism has two main dimensions: national and international. The unification of political and social forces and cooperation are the critical elements for resolving the crisis. At the same time, the resolution of the youth crisis requires decisions and measures to be taken at the domestic level in political, socio-economic, ideological, and religious areas. However, there is no separate program for working with the youth of the above-mentioned category. Therefore, there is no clearly developed paradigm, and methodology of analysis.

Within the framework of this article, for the first time, a methodology for studying youth of this category in Kazakhstan was proposed. Special attention paid to youth is due to the fact that this indicator reflects such important social problems as unemployment and incomplete education, which hinder the effective participation of young people in society. The analysis of domestic experience and group discussions held within the framework of this study indicates that Kazakhstan system of social protection of the youth should be improved. An analysis of the characteristics and assessment of the motives for involving young people in non-traditional religious communities made it possible to develop recommended methods for working with this category of young people.

The author offers the integrative framework, based on the methodology, consisting of four primaries I - tools for achieving these goals: Inclusive; Involvement; Income; Ideology.

Inclusive. As a study reveals, it is very important to involve young people into public life and to give them the opportunity for education. In the current economic conditions, it is important to determine the priority of youth employment in national programs for social and economic development in the country. The need to ensure sustainable economic development in regions with a high degree of a radical threat, along with creating jobs, primarily for young people, as an alternative to involvement in extremist activities.

Involvement. The main mechanism for integrating this group of youth into society is professional training, religious education, and employment. One of the most effective mechanisms for social adaptation of the youth in Kazakhstan can be programs of youth education. Training and education are aimed at improving the skills of the unemployed, and at the same time contributing to meeting the demand for labor force. Some programs are designed to prepare for work, while others offer a full range of services, which include vocational training. Such programs should be implemented with the state support and managed by the ministries of labor and educational institutions. The main support mechanisms to combat unemployment and to support socially vulnerable groups, namely, youth, including the unemployed, are social elevators and benefits.

Income. Another useful practice of combating youth unemployment, according to the analysis, should be part-time internships. This mechanism is also implemented with the state support. The program of adaptation, training of young people should provide them with an income, temporary job for the summer months, to give them additional professional and life skills, the opportunity to deviate from non-traditional religious movements, to improve themselves, to have a sense of their goals.

Ideology: in the religious sphere, the government should continue the consolidation of the Muslim Ummah and block radical movements. Further institutional support for the SAMK, and above all,

strengthening the traditional model of Islam by nominating among its supporters a group of authoritative Muslim intellectuals who can publicly, competently, and convincingly conduct discussions and debates and thereby become a kind of rulers of thoughts for the Muslim community. In this context, the most urgent problem of preventing religious extremism in Kazakhstan is introducing the practice of traditional Muslim communities of an individual approach to each member; introduction of training modules aimed at the prevention of violent extremism in school education.

These tools are aligned to strengthen political and social-economic modernization processes at the national level, which can contribute to good governance, eradication of corruption and inequality, poverty elimination, the establishment of a just and inclusive society, income growth, shared prosperity, ideological work, reduction of conflicts and increasing resilience to a political crisis.

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